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From the Tibetan Buddhist tradition comes the 
following story:
Shalipa was a low-caste woodcutter who lived near 
the charnel ground of Bighapur. Packs of wolves 
came by night to eat the corpses (in a charnel 
ground, corpses are simply deposited on the ground 
to decay or be eaten by wild animals). The wolves 
howled all night long, and Shalipa became more and 
more afraid of them until he could neither eat by day
nor sleep by night for fear of the howling of wolves. 
One evening a wandering yogin stopped by his 
cottage asking for food. Shalipa gave him food and 
drink, and, well pleased, the yogin repaid him with a 
discourse on the virtues of fearing samsara 
(conditioned existence) and practicing the dharma. 
Shalipa thanked him but said, 'Everyone fears 
samsara. But I have a specific fear. Wolves come to 
the charnel ground and howl all night, and I am so 
afraid of them that I can neither eat nor sleep nor 
practice the dharma. Please can't you give me a spell
so that I can stop the howling of the wolves?' The 
yogin laughed and said, 'Foolish man. What good will 
it do you to eat the food of greed when you do not 
know what food is? What good will it do you to sleep 
the corpse-like sleep of ignorance when you do not 
know what rest is? What good will it do you to 
destroy the howling of the wolves with the spells or 
anger when you do not know what hearing or any 
other sense is? If you will follow my instructions, I will
teach you to destroy all fear.' Shalipa accepted the 
yogin as his teacher, gave him all that he had, and 
begged him for instruction. After giving him 
initiation, the yogin told him to move into the charnel
ground with the wolves and to mediate ceaselessly 
upon all sound as identical to the howling of wolves. 
Shalipa obeyed him. Gradually he came to 
understand the nature of all sound and of all reality. 
He meditated for nine years, overcame all 
obscurations of his mind and body, lost all fear, and 
attained great realization. Thereafter, he wore a wolf 
skin around his shoulders and was know as Shalipa 
(the wolf yogin). He taught his disciples many 
different practices about the nature of appearances 
and reality. He taught the unity of appearance, 
emptiness, wisdom, and skillful means. Finally, in 
that very body, he went to the realm of the Heroes. 2
If ever there was an ancient portrait of the alienated 
modern (or postmodern) man, it is Shalipa as we first
see him. He has societal problems, being poor, low 
caste and powerless; environmental problems, being 
forced to live beside a charnel ground in which 
wolves roam and howl; medical problems since he 
can neither eat nor sleep properly; psychological 
problems, a rampantly spreading wolf phobia; and 
spiritual problems, for he says he is too upset to 
practice the dharma. We can readily understand and 
empathize with him when we first meet him, 
shivering in his hut and complaining to his visitor.
But then the story shifts, becoming less readily 
available to the modern sensibility. Shalipa's mentor 
does not advise him to move away, to sue the 
owners of the charnel ground, to delve into the 
meaning of wolf howls in his personal history, or to 
endure his fate as a means of religious salvation. 
Rather he is instructed to use his own experience in 
meditation to undergo a radical transformation in 
how he senses, knows, and feels. He emerges with 
freedom from his problems and the power to act on 
and for others. What is this transformation in 
knowing, feeling, acting, and relating and how it is 
achieved? What might this story have to tell us about
how we view the world in our present psychology and
how it may be alternatively viewed through the eyes 
of the meditative traditions?
In this chapter, I will first delineate our present 
understanding or portrait of a human as it appears in
the cognitive sciences and in folk psychology, 
arguing that this portrait precisely fits Shalipa's initial
status and condition. Second, I will attempt to show 
that this portrait is not a modern anomaly but 
matches the description of samsara in ancient 
Buddhism (and other meditative traditions) and that 
it has a universal experiential basis which is 
discovered by self observing beginning meditators. 
(The material on mediators is based on observations,
participations, conversations, and interviews with 
meditators from various groups.) Finally, I will seek to
show how continued experiential examination in the 
meditative traditions reveals an alternative mode of 
knowing, feeling, acting, and being which offers a 
radically different human portrait. Might this latter 
mode of knowing provide a possible basis for a future
(post post modern perhaps) science of psychology? 
  
  
I. PORTRAIT OF THE MIND IN THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCES
What is a human being? What is the human mind? 
When we hear such questions, what do we think? 
What images come to mind? Cultures, religions, and 
the various sciences offer differing portraits of the 
human being; these are crucially important to the 
ways in which we may then seek to study, help, 
instruct, regulate (or perhaps enjoy) those humans. 
What portrait of the human do we have that leads 
the scientist to feel that experience is not a proper 
approach to the study of minds, that the mind must 
be treated as though it is an external object to be 
examined objectively according to the canons of 
natural science? What portrait of the human do we 
have that led to modernism and to it's present 
breakdown as described elsewhere in this volume? 
The information processing view of the mind held by 
present experimental psychology (and the cognitive 
sciences as a whole) may be our most concise 
formulation, a pinpointing, of the principles 
underlying such a portrait.
Let us begin, therefore, with the model of the mind 
provided by the modern cognitive sciences. The mind
is seen as an information processing system.3 
Outside of the mind is an objective world, such as is 
studied by physics. Information from that world 
enters the mind through the sense organs where it 
proceeds through various stages of short term 
memory and is finally stored in long term memory.  
In this process the information is transformed into 
cognitive representations (re-representations) of the 
external world and of one's self in that world. One 
also develops causal theories about the world and 
one's self and habits of actions based on these. 
Information from the representations and theories in 
long term storage also go back to the sense organs 
so that one knows how to interpret and appraise (in 
accordance with one's expectations and goals) 
incoming stimuli, and it goes out along the motor 
pathways so that one can act.
Now let's look at the implications of this portrait of 
the mind for the issues raised by the Shalipa story. 
For the sake of organization we can divide these 
implications into the three classical divisions of 
knowing (cognition), feeling (conation), and action, 
and add to it a fourth category, implications for 
relationships with other people.
In terms of knowing, the information processor is 
inside of the information processing system and is 
separate from its objects. This separated knower 
constructs its cognitive representations out of bits of 
information that come its way, and it sees everything
in terms of these representations. As to the feeling, 
appetitive, wanting part of the person: just as objects
of knowledge are outside of the system, so are 
objects of desire, while the independent, separated 
wanter of objects is inside of the system. Perhaps the
most clear cut rendition of this separated wanter 
appears in classical utility theory in economics.4 
Inside the information processing system is a rational
wanter who computes the utilities and probabilities 
possessed by external objects of desire and then acts
rationally on the world to try to obtain these 
objects ... and then more objects and more objects. 
And what is action in the cognitive science mode of 
thinking? It is based on rules. How can someone 
catch a baseball? We can work out a rather elaborate
set of rules of motion based on vectors and 
trajectories from physics and then attempt to 
program a robot to catch a baseball based on those 
rules. How can a person make a moral decision? Now
we need an explicit set of moral rules and a program 
for weighting and combining them to make moral 
judgements.
Finally how does the information processor so 
described relate to other people? In a certain sense, 
(s)he never does. Isolated inside the information 
processing system, all (s)he ever sees or knows or 
wants or can act from is his/her cognitive 
representations which are related only indirectly 
(perhaps in the long run only by evolution) to 
anything or anyone in the autonomous outside world.
Popular psychiatry says we have intimacy problems 
with other people. Of course! From this point of view,
I do not actually see this hand which is in front of my 
eyes or feel this table I am touching, so we have 
intimacy problems with everything sensations, 
perceptions, thoughts, emotions, actions, much less 
with anything as global and awesome as another 
person.
This model of the human mind is not confined to the 
single discipline of academic psychology. A major 
theme of modern philosophy since Brentano and 
then Husserl has been how it is possible for mental 
states to be always about something other than and 
separate from themselves (see, for example, 
Dreyfus5), an issue misleadingly called the problem 
of intentionality. In linguistics, it has generally been 
assumed since antiquity that language can only get 
its meaning by means of reference to independent 
objects and states of the world.6 Psychoanalysis, one
might think, is sufficiently intimate and internal to be
an exception to the model, but if we actually look at 
Freud, his system is a perfect portrait of 
cognitivism.7 The mind is made of mental 
representations which are about something external,
even in the unconscious. Objects of desire are always
outside: the id wants to grab them right away; the 
superego generates rules that say no; and the best 
that the beleaguered ego can do is make some 
compromises, while the person remains ever 
unsatisfied. On the more societal level8, the popular 
social exchange theory in sociology, anthropology, 
social psychology, and economics views the 
psychological motives behind social interaction as 
the attempt of each individual to bring as many good
things as possible within his/her boundaries while 
paying out as little as possible of his/her scarce 
resources. It isn't just professionals who think in 
these ways; as surveys how, the (wo)man in the 
street largely agrees.
Such an alienated portrait of the human has not gone
unnoticed by thinkers in our culture, and it is popular
to attribute it to some aspect or fault in modern 
civilization. In fact you may be saying to yourself 
right now, 'Ah-hah! That's Cartesianism! That's our 
modern western dualistic portrait of the mind, and 
that should be contrasted with all the rest of the 
world which doesn't see things that way.' Or you 
might think that such a model is the product of post-
industrial-revolution alienation which is now 
spreading around the world but that it does not apply
to peoples in pre-industrial or ancient times. Or that 
it is the result of secularization, patriarchy, or any 
number of particular causes without which it did not 
or would not operate.
But what about Shalipa as we originally meet him? 
Here is a pre-Cartesian, pre-industrial revolution, pre-
secularization, nonwestern man as alienated from his
world and his feelings as ever you might wish. We 
have no trouble at all understanding and identifying 
with his state of mind as he sits huddled in his hut, 
terrified of the howling wolves; our difficulties or 
questions have to do with what happens to him after 
that when his understanding and experience start to 
change.
I wish to argue that the dualistic and alienated 
understanding of a human being which prevails 
today in the social and cognitive sciences is not a 
historical or social accident; rather, it is a 
representation of a deep and universal aspect of folk 
psychology, an aspect which in the Buddhist (and to 
some extent Hindu) traditions is called samsara. 
Samsara is where humans will, it is said, discover 
themselves to be as, though training in meditation, 
they become mindful, instead of mindless, of their 
mental processes and actions in everyday life.
So let us turn now to the issue of meditation, of 
experience, and of experimental method. Western 
scientific psychology explicitly seeks to study mind 
from the outside as though it were an object of the 
natural sciences. The meditative traditions provide 
an alternative route, methodologies for learning 
about the mind/consciousness/living being from the 
inside, paths for gaining knowledge about the living 
being as that being itself. 
  
  
II. PORTRAITS OF THE MIND FROM THE MEDITATIVE 
TRADITIONS 
A. Meditation as a Means to Knowledge
It is common for western experimental psychologists 
to equate any use of the mind for self investigation 
with introspection, a mode of inquiry to which we are
understandably allergic. Introspectionism as a school
of psychology, made popular by the nineteenth-
century psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, failed 
definitively to provide a basis for experimental 
psychology. The reader has probably discovered the 
problem with what we call introspection for him or 
herself many times. When one simply tries to 
introspect, to look inward, about a problem for 
example, the chances are that one finds one's 
thoughts going round and round, and the best one 
can hope for is to think some additional, hopefully 
satisfying, thought about one's thoughts. Without a 
proper method we are caught in our conceptual 
systems. It is precisely to cut through such 
introspection that various meditative techniques 
were discovered.
A second misleading picture of meditation held by 
westerners involves dissociation of mind and body: 
trance, hypnotism, 'mystical' experiences, and 
altered states of consciousness. While such states 
must be included in any psychology of the whole of 
human capacity, they are no more central to what 
the meditative traditions have to tell us about 
knowing than any other human state or activity.
Perhaps the simplest contrast to both introspection 
and dissociation is the meditative methods called 
mindfulness. Mindfulness is a term used in some of 
the Buddhist traditions, particularly Theravada, some
Zen, and by some Tibetan teachers9. Mindfulness is 
described as experiencing what mind and body are 
doing as they are doing it, being present with one's 
mind, body, and energy in their ordinary states of 
occurrence. A related concept from the more bodily 
oriented practices, such as the martial arts, is 
integration in which body, energy, mind, intention, 
awareness, and action come to form one 
nonfragmented, integrated whole.10 Whatever the 
terminology or school of meditation, in my 
observations, meditative techniques of 
concentration, calming, alert observation, and 
integration render people more viable instruments of
self-observation. What then is the portrait of the 
human that emerges from the meditative traditions? 
I will trace the evolution of this portrait and what it 
has to tell us about modes of knowing though several
stages of development. 
  
  
B. Discoveries of the Beginning Mediator
Attention. Beginning meditators are usually shocked. 
Their first and immediate discovery is often about 
the nature of attention. Mental contents change 
rapidly and continuously: thoughts, sensations, 
feelings, worries, daydreams, inner conversations, 
sleepiness, fantasies, plans, memories, theories, 
emotions, self-instructions about the techniques, 
judgements about thoughts and feelings, judgements
about judgements. All meditators who sit still and 
use a mental technique, regardless of their tradition, 
purpose, or technique report these kinds of 
experiences. This is a point easily discoverable also 
by the nonmeditating reader; simply notice what the 
mind is doing as one tries to keep attention on some 
simple mental, or even physical, task.
Even more pointed than noticing the constant 
shifting of attention is the discovery that attention is,
for the most part, indirect. That is, the mind is not 
sharply present with its experiences as they are 
happening but rather drifts about not noticing that it 
has left its assigned object or task until the meditator
or task oriented person 'comes back' with a 'jerk' to 
the present. Then the meditator realizes, not only 
that he had been 'away', but that while he was 
wandering, he was not really aware of what he was 
thinking or feeling; he now only remembers what had
been going on in his mind through a haze of 
summarizing concepts and judgements. This is not 
merely the case for unpleasant experiences from 
which one might expect a person to want to 
dissociate. Even the simplest or most pleasurable of 
daily activities eating, walking, talking with a friend 
tend to pass rapidly in a blur of commentary as one 
hastens to the next mental occupation. (just notice 
what your mind does at the next meal).
In the cognitive science portrait of the mind, knowing
was indirect. Now we see one experiential basis for 
modelling it in this way. However, meditators (or 
anyone else) can only discover the indirectness of 
attention by contrast, that is, by experiencing 
moments of being present which are less indirect 
than the moments of wandering. Thus an alternative 
experience, one of directness, has its birth at the 
same time as the experiental discovery of 
indirectness.
The self. When meditators begin to notice 
themselves, even if they are being explicitly taught 
about nonself in the Buddhist tradition, what they 
tend to report is amazement at the power and 
ubiquitousness of their self-concern. Thoughts, 
memories, plans, goals, hopes, fears, judgements, 
etc., all are about oneself or others important to 
oneself. The constantly shifting emotive tone of 
experience centres on judgements of whether events
are good, bad, or irrelevant to oneself.
And who or what is this self? Leaving theories aside, 
let us contemplate a given moment of experience. 
We ordinarily take experience to be composed of at 
least two aspects: subject and object, perceiver and 
thing perceived. And, as the discovery of self-
referencing has shown, the object of perception is 
normally seen as either desirable or threatening or 
boring to the perceiver who then has impulses to get 
the desirable and avoid or destroy the undesirable. 
This is a relatively simple point (William James11, for 
example, noticed it), which can be readily verified by 
the reader: just look at something, say the wall in 
front of you. Isn't there some sense of a looker, 
perhaps located in the head behind the eyes, looking
at an object spatially located outside yourself? Now 
try looking at an emotionally relevant object such as 
your relationship, favorite food, enemy, or an 
irritating appliance.
Thus in the ordinary experience of the self, we see 
the basis for the separated knower and wanter of 
cognitive science models. However, any meditator 
who gets close enough to experience to begin seeing
this knower and wanter in action also begins to feel a
kind of vertigo of the knower and curiosity about the 
wanter. Who is it who is seeing that see-er who is 
looking at the wall - a second see-er? Beginning 
mindfulness meditators may try to become such a 
second looker, a stance which is quite awkward. But 
if I am not such a second separate and temporally 
continuous knower, then who is it about whose fate I 
am so emotionally concerned? What is knowing and 
wanting? Again, as with attention, the very discovery
in experience of the cognitive sciences' separated 
knower and wanter brings with it a sense of the 
limitations of this approach to understanding.
The body and emotions. Experience of the body and 
experience of emotions are aspects of the knowing 
and feeling self so pointedly confusing to beginning 
meditators that these areas deserve special 
comment. Is my body a part of myself as subject or is
it an other, a separated object of experience? Where 
is the mind when I am 'spaced out' and not 'in' the 
body? Isn't it odd that I can feel alienated from 
something as much part of me as my own body? 
What do all of the mind/body issues of philosophy 
actually mean experientially?
Even more puzzling is the relation of a person to his 
or her emotions. At the same time that people 
identify themselves with an emotion they may also 
be seeing that emotion as an other, as something 
outside of themselves of whose 'attack' they can be 
afraid. Both the body and emotions are boundary 
areas where the model of the separated knower and 
wanter is still in operation but is strained. Such 
issues become matters of living contemplation for 
meditators, especially Buddhist meditators whose 
tradition may point them toward these conundrums.
Goal-directedness and action. The mind becomes 
acutely uncomfortable without goals, without 
something toward which the cognitive and emotional
system is aiming. That is why satisfied desires no 
longer please, and new desires constantly spring up. 
Meditators discover this as, sooner or later, their 
peace-providing meditation technique becomes 
irritating or boring and the mind reaches out, over 
and over again, for something else, some goal, 
something to do.
This constant activity of mind appears directly 
related to action. In fact, some Theravada Buddhist 
mindfulness techniques direct the meditator to slow 
all actions to a crawl and carefully observe the 
impulses and intentions preceding the smallest 
movement. Thus observed, action in general begins 
to show up as a complex matter engendered by self-
referring goals, intentions, plans, evaluations, 
reasoning, strategies, doubts, and efforts. Is this not 
the very picture of the cognitive scientist's models of 
action? 'Yet is all this required for actions?' the 
meditator may begin to wonder? Does the popping 
up of a thought in the mind require preceding plans 
and efforts to think that thought? Does one get out of
bed in the morning by means of thinking about it? 
Thus, as with the knower and the wanter, the 
beginning meditator both discovers and comes to 
question the cognitive scientist's rule-based view of 
action.
Interpersonal relationships. Self-referentiality applies 
to interpersonal relationships. Other people, like any 
other object of the external world, are the objects of 
desires, aversions and indifference depending on 
whether they are seen as good, bad, or irrelevant to 
the self's goals. How saddening it is for decent 
meditators who had thought themselves as altruistic 
as anyone else to begin to notice the subtle and 
devious ways in which self-referentiality may 
manifest. For a mind in its egocentric mode there is 
no way out of this cocoon of self-reference.
This then is the portrait of the alienated information 
processor assumed by the cognitive sciences, 
decried by the humanities, and discovered in 
experience by the beginning meditator. It is where 
we first meet Shalipa, cowering in his hut wishing to 
sleep the sleep of ignorance, eat the food of greed, 
and terrified of the threatening wolves. It is the mode
of knowing, feeling, and acting called samsara in 
Buddhist terminology, the wheel of existence to 
which sentient beings are bound by their habits 
unless they do something to break those habits. 
Other meditative traditions bear similar descriptions. 
Most Hindu schools speak of gross or lower levels of 
consciousness which replicate this picture. The 
beginning Taoist meditator discovers his Monkey who
lives 'alone in the branches of his small tree world ... 
his environment a blur of the frantic activity created 
by unchecked desire.' 12 And western religions 
speak of sin or distance from God.
As indicated previously, what all this suggests is that 
the cognitivist model of modern psychology actually 
has its roots in our basic folk psychology, a 
psychology which is not a product of the modern (or 
postmodern) world, nor of contemporary philosophy, 
nor of social changes, nor of particular customs or 
cultural values. Does that mean that humans are in a
hopeless situation with respect to these matters? To 
be sure, the cognitivist and folk psychological models
stop here with the isolated information processor. 
However, the meditative traditions do not stop here. 
What is to come is the portrait of the full human 
being which is uncovered by pursuing the further 
discoveries of meditation. Our beginning meditator 
may have discovered the alienated samsaric 
information processor experientially, but (s)he did so 
in a context in which that disconnected and needy 
self did not make complete experiential sense. 
Indeed, each time the meditator finds himself as the 
dualistic information processor, (s)he does so against
a background of intuition that there might be an 
entirely different way of knowing and being. Must not
we suppose something like this to have happened to 
Shalipa if we are to make sense of his perseverance 
and eventual realizations? Let us look at these 
further developments in the meditative traditions. 
  
  
C. Further Meditative Discoveries: The Process 
View
Attention can be trained. The ceaseless ungrounded 
activity of the mind can be pacified and the mind can
be taught to hold an object of attention. All 
meditation traditions acknowledge and sometimes 
use this. Almost any object of attention can be used: 
a sight, a mental image, the breath, a mantra, 
sensations, the body in motion, space. The technique
is usually to return again and again to the object of 
meditation. The mind can be taught not only to cease
wandering away from its object, at least temporarily, 
but also to remain alert while holding it. But then 
attention has to be further trained, or perhaps 
untrained, to let go. Holding a particular mental 
content is not the goal of any meditative tradition, 
and some traditions teach letting go in other ways. 
The goal is to develop (discover, click into) a different
mode of knowing and being which is available to 
humans. The attentional aspect of this mode is that 
the mind appears to have the natural ability to be 
present with the flux of experience, the knowing and 
the not knowing aspects of experience, in a relaxed 
and natural way. From the vantage point of this kind 
of attention, the self and the other aspects of 
experience which we have discussed, begin to take 
on a rather different appearance.
The self is unreflectively assumed to be a thing which
abides through time, is independent of other things, 
and needs to be nurtured and protected by the 
person who has it. As meditators become more in 
touch with the reality of their experience, a view of 
the world in terms of unitary things and events tends
to shift to an experience of ongoing processes. For 
example, experiences that were once assumed 
unitary wholes (e.g. 'I was angry all morning' or 'I 
spent the whole night afraid of the howling of the 
wolves') are seen to be a sequence of particular, 
ever-changing sensations and concepts. Traits once 
seen as part of an independent self are noticed to 
arise interdependently with circumstances, and those
circumstances to arise interdependently with 
increasingly more extensive arenas of world events.
Such shifts in view are very useful but are not quite 
the essence of the shift into a new mode of knowing. 
Who is it that is perceiving these interdependent 
processes? As previously stated, we ordinarily take 
experience to be composed of at least two aspects: 
subject and object, knower and known, perceiver and
thing perceived. Initial forms of meditation 
instruction and of meditation may sound as though 
they are intended to exaggerate the sense of a 
constant perceiver, a homunculus who watches and 
comments on the passing flux of experience. 
Buddhist instructions often stress watchfulness, and 
some forms of Hinduism teach a witness 
consciousness. In order to counteract self-
identification with passing experiences or with the 
personality, meditators might be taught to say to 
themselves: 'I am not my thoughts,' 'I am not my 
emotions,' etc. But this sense of an exaggerated 
separate perceiver is limited, temporary, and 
somewhat artificial. Eventually meditators come to 
see, suspect, or at least have a glimmering that the 
subject or perceiver is only the subject side of a 
momentary experience, an aspect of the perception 
or thought itself.,
This is an extremely important point in the 
meditation process. None of the traditions teach that 
meditation is a means of separating oneself from 
one's experience -- a contradiction in terms at best. 
Each tradition, at some point, directs the meditator 
to be in experience but with the broader sense of 
knowing engendered by the training and then 
relaxation of attention. A panoply of techniques exist 
in all the traditions for challenging or pacifying the 
sense of separateness and for an intelligent 
destruction of the artificial sense of an observer. The 
meditator may be told to be the object of meditation 
(the image, breath, howling of wolves, etc.), or 
perhaps to try hard to 'catch' the watcher, or perhaps
to relax and trust completely, or perhaps to perform 
daily work tasks very very rapidly -- the possibilities 
are limitless. This is a point where, when such 
teachings are explicit, meditators are likely to feel 
pushed. An analytic approach to no self can be 
interesting, but the precise experiencing of the lack 
of a separate observer is something from which the 
mind recoils like putting a finger on a hot stove. With
perseverance, however, new possibilities for 
knowing, feeling, and relating can open from this way
of experiencing.
The body. In western psychology, physiology, 
medicine, theology, and common sense, body and 
mind are generally considered separate things. The 
body is seen as undebatably material and solid while 
the mind is a something else, a something whose 
nature and relationship to the body has long been 
the subject of much speculative debate. There are 
several ways in which meditative experiences 
challenge our notions of the body and of the 
body/mind experience.
1. The body can be experienced as patterns of 
energy and space rather than solely as solid matter. 
To get a sense of this vision the reader might try the 
following contemplation13: imagine your body as a 
giant and your mind as a tiny traveler inside the 
body. Progressively increase the size of the body so 
that the traveler is exploring at increasingly micro 
levels of structure; then turn the contemplation onto 
the traveller who is doing the exploring.
2. Body and mind can be experienced in a 
meaningful way as actually not separate. In that 
case, the body is described as a part of knowing, as 
self-knowing, rather than as an inert thing that can 
be known only from the outside.
3. Bodily energy is experienced as moving in certain 
channels (as in acupuncture meridians in Chinese 
medicine). These are experientially quite real, and 
manipulating them has notable effects (as you may 
have experienced if you have ever undergone an 
acupuncture treatment). These channels do not 
correspond to western neurological maps. When 
observer and observed are experienced as not 
separate, the energy flows can be self manipulated 
without medical assistance14.
4. There are certain energy centres within the body 
(the chakras) which have particular characteristics. 
Most of the meditative traditions acknowledge the 
existence of these, but by no means all techniques or
all meditators work with them. For those who do, the 
centres can be of central importance. When 
perceived or approached with our usual restricted, 
dualistic mode of knowing, the centres themselves 
appear constricted or closed, and each centre 
appears to form the nexus of its own type of neurotic
energy. When approached with a non-dualistic 
openness, each centre can be experienced as the 
seat of its corresponding broader knowing or wisdom.
For example, the head centre, normally the basis of 
intellectualization and criticism, is said to open to a 
pure mirror-like seeing, and the heart centre, in 
which feelings of sadness and grief are often 
experienced, is said to give rise to the experiences of
inclusive, accepting, timeless space and of 
connectedness to the world.
Emotions. As was previously pointed out, for a mind 
in its egocentric mode of knowing, emotions are the 
monitoring of duality, of how the subject is doing in 
relation to its objects, to its desires and goals, to 
others, to its world. The slightest threat to the self's 
territory (a cut finger, a disobedient child) arouses 
fear or anger. The slightest hope of self 
enhancement (money, praise, pleasure) arouses 
excitement, desire or greed. The first hint that a 
situation may be irrelevant to the self (waiting in line,
meditating) produces boredom. In Buddhism, these 
three motivational factors, aggression, passion, and 
ignorance, are what keep samsara operating. They 
are said to be what keep humans, such as Shalipa, 
bound to the habitual mode of knowing and feeling.
But in many of the meditative schools, emotions, like
other phenomena, are Janus faced. When they are 
experienced in a non-dualistic, open mode of 
knowing, they can be seen, it is said, not as problems
but as the basic energies of the universe. Some 
meditative traditions talk of coming to see, tuning 
into, riding on, being with, or becoming one with the 
energy level of the emotion and thereby achieving 
wisdom. Taoism talks of seeing the energy of the 
different emotions as the very elements out of which 
nature is composed (how could it be otherwise?) and 
thereby achieving harmony. For example, anger 
might be recognized as the element fire which can 
be used appropriately. In Tibetan Buddhism, basic 
emotions, when seen in their totality, are the very 
stuff of the basic wisdoms. For example, the energy 
of pride is (transmutable into) the wisdom of 
equanimity. In short, emotions can function as 
egocentric obstacles or as potent catalysts for 
wisdom.
Goal directedness and action. The constant 
discontent of habitual desires and goal orientation 
obscures the broader, more open sense of knowing 
of which we have been speaking. Meditation 
techniques abound to relax, outwit, stun, or perhaps 
utilize the energy of desire and goal directness of the
apparently separated knower and wanter. We 
ordinarily think of freedom as being able to do, what 
we want to do following our desires and goals. But 
meditators begin to see that their goals and sense of 
choice are determined by habits, conditioning, and 
circumstances and are anything but free. With great 
delight people report an occasional experience of 
what feels like real freedom - precisely when they 
have done what they describe as letting go of 
desires, goal directedness and choice.
But without desires and goals, how can there by 
action? Would one lie in bed unable to get up, even 
for growing physical necessities? Would one 
randomly and affectlessly murder respectable 
people? These are our fantasies about freedom. 
What meditators, artists (and many ordinary people) 
say is that it is precisely when they are, even very 
briefly, without the usual sense of goal directedness 
that they can act spontaneously in ways appropriate 
to the situation at hand. For example, it is well 
documented that people who act heroically in times 
of emergency (plunge into icy water to save a 
drowning child and so on) often report that they did 
not think, decide, or choose but simply did it. 
Furthermore, such actions may involve skills which 
the rescuer says he did not know he possessed. 
Action is not necessarily what we assume it is.
Interpersonal relations. From the point of view of the 
limited, dualistic, samsaric information processor; 
relating with other people is a dismal business, 
which, just like relations with the rest of nature, can 
only consist (with varying degrees of refinement) of 
separation, ignorance, aggression, and greed. 
Meditators say that meditation affects their view of 
interpersonal relationships. Glimpses of a state in 
which there is neither separation of the knower nor 
desire for future goals also reveals the possibility of 
an open and receptive relationship to people beyond 
the manipulative streetfighter mentality. I have 
never spoken with a meditator who was pleased with
his progress (an important caveat) who did not 
mention something about feeling more at ease, more
understanding, or more kindness towards other 
people. Many, including the dissatisfied, have 
experienced glimpses described as non-
separateness, open-heartedness, or compassion. A 
few individuals appear to undergo a marked change 
in their orientation to people. 
  
  
D. A New Mode of Knowing and Being
Some meditators in all traditions find or glimpse a 
truly new mode of knowing and being. They variously
attribute their ability to do this to factors such as 
perseverance, relaxation, or special attunement to 
realized teachers (or deities). The glimpse is 
generally described, not as a new experience, but as 
a finding, or tapping into, a mode of knowing and 
being which was there all along within ordinary 
experience but which they had hitherto ignored.15 
These glimpses, they often say, are what keep them 
going. Various characteristics (or noncharacteristics) 
are ascribed to this mode of knowing and being:
1. It is not a subject/object form of knowing, not 
located in a knowing subject who knows objects. 
There is just the knowing; experiences are 'self 
known.'
2. There is no desire in it, no reaching beyond the 
experience itself. It is contented, relaxed, adequate, 
doesn't care about the concerns of passion and 
aggression.
3. It has a spacelike or spacious aspect. This 
experience can be evoked by experiences of ordinary
space. (Perhaps that is why humans are so enamored
of views and sweeping vistas.)
4. It is nontemporal, not located in time, not 
localizable in the past, future, or even present, 
timeless. (For this nontemporality, some traditions 
use the word permanent.)
5. It has no limits or boundaries. It is not a limited 
capacity system; capacity is not a relevant 
descriptive dimension.
6. It is not graspable, describable, conceptualizable, 
formulatable or modelable; it is a nonconceptual 
knowing. It is said to be beyond words, beyond 
concepts, and not an object of the conceptual mind. 
It is violated somewhat by any description of it 
including all that is said here.
(It should be noted that the Buddhist term emptiness
can be, and has been, used with respect to any or all 
of these first six aspects.)
7. It accommodates/includes/accepts everything, all 
content, unconditionally.
8. It is of supreme value, worth everything. When 
meditators speak of their actual experience, this is 
the most important aspect, the sine qua non, the 
reason why anyone would want to bother with boring
meditations, arcane retreats, humbling mindfulness, 
frustrating spiritual groups, or cantankerous gurus in 
the first place. Our culture and our psychology 
separate the knowing dimension from the 
value/emotive dimension16 as I have been doing 
hitherto in this chapter. But the experience here is 
that at the very basis of experience, the two are not 
separate.
9. Knowledge of the ordinary subject/object, 
space/time limited world can be from this broader, 
unlimited, accommodating, unconditionally valued 
perspective. The more limited known world is seen as
not separate from the broader view. This can be 
expressed as a new epistemological vision of the 
origin of experience - that relative experience is born
afresh each instant out of the ground of this 
nonconceptual, primordial knowing. Or it can be 
expressed as an ontological statement - that nothing 
is ever born or separated from that ground when 
viewed from the perspective of the broader 
experience of totality. But perhaps foremost it is a 
very personal, transformative, deeply therapeutic 
vision of the inherent value of the world and of 
experience.
10. When actions 'come from' this mode of knowing 
and being, they happen with felt spontaneity, and 
turn out to be situationally appropriate, of benefit to 
others, and sometimes shockingly skillful. This is 
perhaps the state which is called nonaction. 
  
  
E. Integration and Wholeness
In the final vision, all of the aspects of experience 
which we have treated as separate are seen to form 
an integrated whole. Cognition is not separate from 
emotion. Mind and body are not separate. The 
perceiver is not separate from the perception. Action 
is not separate from knowing in its broadest sense. 
Time is not separate from the timeless, desires, from 
the desireless, nor emotions from the sense of 
unconditional accommodation. The self is not 
separate from the rest of the world, from others, or 
from inherent value. Fundamental value is not 
separate from knowing, from emotion, from 
anything. And this very vision of integration is not 
separate from the fragmented world which does not 
see but does need it.
This is finally the vision of Shalipa who came to see 
all sound as not separate from the howling of wolves,
the hearer and fearer of the howling of wolves as not 
separate from the sound, and the sounds and their 
fearer as not separate from the limitless, timeless, 
spacious, ungraspable, unconditionally valued mode 
of knowing and being which the meditative traditions
claim is the heritage of all people. 
  
  
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY
There are two kinds of implications for psychology. 
For psychology as it is presently constituted, a few 
specific suggestions come to mind which might affect
various content areas. The more general implication, 
however, concerns the building of a new psychology 
from the point of view of the meditative mode of 
knowing and being. Let us begin with the specific 
suggestions.
Attention. What is even more remarkable than that 
the contents of mind are continually shifting is how 
little interest researchers in attention have shown in 
this phenomenon. William James 17 speculated about
the stream of consciousness at the turn of the 
century, and the portrayal of stream of 
consciousness has had various literary vogues, but 
experimental psychology has remained mute on this 
point, the very building block of phenomenological 
awareness.
Psychology has been likewise mute about the 
training of attention -- other than to classify some 
extreme problems as attention deficit disorders for 
which drugs are prescribed. Meditators who have 
actually succeeded in some form of attention training
and stabilization report benefits in other aspects of 
their lives such as work and school. It is interesting 
that we have no methods for training attention and 
do not teach such matters in school despite the great
prevalence of attention problems among students at 
all levels.
The indirect or post hoc quality of attention has not 
gone totally unnoticed by western psychology. A 
classical debate exists between the bottom up and 
top down approaches to processing models with top 
down models emphasizing the role that concepts, 
memory, theories, goals, and intentions play in 
determining attention and perception. In the present 
era of computer modeling, top down theorizing has 
gained ascendancy, and it is often asserted that 
perception is inherently abstract and theory laden. 
What both approaches miss is the distinction 
between the usual indirect, conceptualized state of 
mind and a mind directly present with its perceptions
and thoughts.
Finally, while the relaxation industry has some 
awareness that changes in attention can lead to 
relaxation, there is little popular exploration of the 
idea that the training and then letting go of attention
can lead to wisdom.
Emotion. Since the Greeks, western psychology has 
treated affect and cognition as separate faculties, 
states, or processes, and through history cognition 
has been valued more positively than affect. Emotion
tends to be seen as irrational and reason as 
affectless. The meditation traditions offer a direct 
challenge to this model. In the first place affect and 
cognition are not separate. It takes only a little 
mindfulness to realize that emotive tone, a feeling 
quality, is universal in experience.
Emotion is an area in which interesting congruences 
exist between reports of meditators and some 
laboratory experimental work. Contrary to folk 
psychology, both meditators and laboratory studies 
show that emotions occur in momentary bursts rather
than in continuous sequences18 and that actual 
affect is quickly replaced in memory by conceptual 
summaries19. A number of other interesting parallels 
are outlined by Pickering20. The meditator's 
discovery that for the samsaric mind, emotions are 
the monitoring of how well the self is doing in 
relation to its desires and goals in the world is 
strongly reminiscent of a number of self monitoring 
and appraisal accounts of emotion21. What the 
psychological paradigms lack, however, and could 
well use, is the account contributed by the 
meditative traditions of how people can go beyond 
the self monitoring and appraisal mode of feeling and
acting to tap into their more integrated 'wisdom' 
mode.
The body. The body could be a fertile ground for 
interaction between meditative and scientific 
approaches. Practical interest in the relationship 
between body and mind is growing in the west - as 
witnessed by numerous new body oriented 
psychotherapies,22 by programs in somatic 
psychology which are appearing on college 
campuses, and by private and government funding 
of research on eastern medical systems. At this time,
actual research tends to be still largely oriented 
toward proving whether particular nonwestern 
treatments cure particular diseases. At some point, 
researchers will need to address a potential 
revolution in our understanding of the body: what 
new view of psychology and physiology might we 
need that can encompass phenomena such as space,
energy, channels, chi, and chakras as well as the 
phenomena of western medicine?
The self. Many aspects of the analysis of the self in 
the meditative traditions could provide grist for 
western psychology23. Researchers on the self might
well notice that their subjects think, feel, and act as 
though they, personally, are dealing with a real and 
supremely important self and not merely with a 
hierarchy of concepts. The interdependence of the 
so-called self with the rest of the world is addressed 
most explicitly in psychology by the use of dynamical
systems theory modeling24, but this global system is
not of use for most issues and needs to be 
augmented.
In regard to the self's relation to other people, given 
the current interest in altruism research in 
psychology, not to mention the state of the world, 
any leads which the meditative traditions can 
provide concerning the transformation of an attitude 
of passion, aggression, and ignoring into an attitude 
of compassion are surely not to be neglected. 
Likewise, the world is certainly in need of 
spontaneous, surprisingly skillful actions, and 
research on spontaneous actions (as in 'impossibly' 
well handled emergencies) is surely to be supported.
In our culture, societal problems are dealt with by 
governments, medical problems by doctors, 
psychological problems by clinicians, and questions 
about perception, bodily processes, and emotions by 
the burgeoning technical experimental literature 
modeled after the physical sciences. The Shalipa 
story shows how, from the point of view of one 
meditative tradition, all of these issues are dealt with
in an integrated fashion based on experience. 
Virtually any aspect of the meditative path by which 
the separated and needy information processor is 
transformed into the integrated knower with which 
we ended our account should be of great interest to 
clinical psychology. Such work is beginning25 but 
rather tentatively, with the tendency to keep western
clinical models relatively intact (but see Henderson26;
Pransky & Mills 27)28. It should be obvious that from 
the point of view of the meditative traditions in their 
original context, (from the point of view, let us say, of
Shalipa after he attained realization), what passes for
clinical practice in the west is little more than 
rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. Which is 
to say that the contact between our clinical theories 
and the meditative traditions has far reaching, as yet
undeveloped, potential.
All this said, what psychology may really need is a 
major paradigm shift to take into account the 
broader portrait of what a human being is and can do
provided by the meditative traditions. The only way 
to do this is to rely on the authority of individual 
experience; quibbling about established usages and 
the so-called canons of science at this point is simply
blindness. Perhaps such a shift requires a body of 
psychologists who have personal experience 
themselves of that broader mode of knowing and 
being; perhaps it is such a community which will 
eventually rewrite psychology.
Actually coming to see and realize any of the aspects
of that new mode of knowing and being is immensely
transformative to individuals personally. Hopefully, it
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